Advaita Vedanta does not naively say
that Brahman is real or that the world of dualities is unreal. To
attribute this sort of statement to the system would be something like
calling the dog a bad name in order to hang it. The sense in which the
doctrine asserts the absoluteness of Brahman would also explain the
sense in which its relation to the world of experience is to be
understood. My feeling is, this doubt arises due to a superficial
reading of the philosophical problem involved, just either by hearsay or
reading some titbits here and there, without going into the
profundities of the subject.
The Advaita Vedanta does not hang on
Sruti alone, though it has no reason to doubt the validity of the word
of the Sruti. Firstly, take the question concerning the Sruti: The
statement that Brahman is the cause of the Veda is not to be understood
as if the Veda is an effect proceeding from Brahman as the cause, in
which case the Veda would be non-eternal. What this position actually
means is that the Veda is to be understood as an embodiment of eternal
principles or truths, and here what is to be considered as eternal is
the principle involved and not necessarily the way in which it is
embodied in word or language.
For instance, to give an example, that two
and two make four can be taken as a permanent principle which cannot be
changed, but the language in which it is expressed or the purpose for
which it is applied need not be taken as equally permanent; because the
same truth can be expressed differently in different languages and may
be applied for variegated purposes. Also, Brahman does not cause the
Veda as a potter causes the pot or a carpenter causes the table. Here
causation is to be understood in a highly metaphysical sense, and not in
an empirical way.
The very fact of the existence of Brahman implies the
existence of the eternal principles mentioned, even as, we may say, the
fact of the existence of a three-dimensional universe implies the
validity of the principles of mathematics. We cannot say that
mathematics is caused by the three-dimensional world, so that
mathematics would be a non-eternal fact. On the other hand, the fact of
the validity of mathematics is a logical consequence of the
three-dimensional world of space and time, and a logical deduction does
not become non-eternal merely because it proceeds from a premise. The
premise is in a way the cause of the deduction in a logical process of
implication, but the implication does not become non-eternal because it
is inseparable from the fact of the premise. Thus, the causation of
Brahman in respect of the Veda does not in any way mean the
non-eternality of the Veda, if we are careful to see that causation here
is understood logically and not empirically in the sense of something
proceeding from something else as if the one is different from the
other.
Further, it is sometimes suggested
that even the word of the Veda is eternal, even as an embodiment of
eternal principles. This, again, is to be understood in its proper
spirit. We may explain this position thus. Though the expression of a
fact in a particular language may be considered as non-eternal, in the
sense that it is finite because of its differentiation from other
languages, yet the fact of it being possible to express a thing in that
particular way should be considered as a permanent possibility, and here
the word assumes a sort of eternality, Parinaminityatva, to put it in
the language of Acharya Sankara, though not Kutasthanityatva as is the
nature of Brahman itself. No one can say that the English language, for
instance, is an eternal fact. Yet, no one can also deny the possibility
of expressing a fact in that mode of language at any time or claim that
the possibility can ever be absent and be non-eternal. I hope you catch
the point of this interesting feature.
When Acharya Sankara says that the
Veda itself is unreal from the Paramarthika point of view, the same is
to be understood in the sense of nothing being eternal except Brahman,
and even the Veda cannot be eternal if it is to be understood as
something other than Brahman, for there cannot be two infinities or two
eternalities. Here you will notice that the two apparently
contradictory statements of Acharya Sankara are really not
contradictory, for they have to be understood from two different points
of view or angles of vision, from which position the statements are
made.
The problem of free will and
determinism can also be explained by a homely example afforded by the
science of psychoanalysis, to give only one instance as to how it can be
explained. The patient is made think in a particular manner by the
determined will of the psychoanalyst, but patient always feels that he
or she is having out of complete freedom of choice, notwithstanding the
determinism of the will of the physician that is at the back of it.
Perhaps you remember the interesting statement of Spinoza that a stone
which is thrown into the sky by someone may feel that it is moving up of
its own choice, if only it had consciousness of its movement. We feel
that we eat a particular diet out of our free will and nobody compels us
to eat such and such a thing, though it is well known that the choice
of diet is determined by the physiological condition of the person; so
where is free will here? Swami Vidyaranya, in his Panchadasi, says that
free will is the way in which the omnipresent will of the Absolute (or
you may say, Isvara) operates through the individuality of a created
being. Here, again, it is a question of viewpoint or standpoint. The
consciousness of agency in action is what is known as free will, though
this consciousness itself may be impelled by a law that is operating in
the universe. So, where is the contradiction between determinism and
free will? Man will not be held responsible for his acts if he is
conscious from the bottom of his heart that the universal law is
operating through him, but he will certainly be responsible for what he
does if he knows that he exists as an individual and therefore actions
proceed from him and not from the universal reality. No one can do wrong
unless this doing proceeds from individual consciousness which
contradicts the fact of its being determined by another. Thus, there is a
mix-up of arguments here, when doubts are raised as to how man can do
wrong if he is determined. The doubt arises from a fallacious argument.
The problem of evil, again, is an old,
hackneyed theme, which has been explained by masters of thought
already. It exists in the world even as illness exists in a human
organism. But do you believe that illness really exists in a person
unless there is a maladjustment of the parts of the organism? The evil
does not exist except as a condition of operation, and it is not to be
understood as a thing hanging over us from somewhere outside. All this
difficulty arises due to an anthropomorphic conception of God as
somebody sitting in heaven and controlling the destiny of the universe.
If God is understood as universal Omnipresence or Absolute Being, the
very question of evil will be a self-contradiction, because that would
imply the finitude of God. Here, again, the flaw in the argument that
raises such questions can be seen.
